On three occasions in 2021 and 2022, Islamic State (IS) cells in north-east Syria attempted to carry out major, complex attacks on detention centers housing IS prisoners and suspected affiliates. In this report, CAR investigates the weapons used in the attacks, showing how common links between the materiel used by the different cells shows that they were closely linked and supported by a centralised distribution network that equips top-tier members for specific, high-profile, operations.

This fifth edition of CAR’s Diversion Digest presents cases from the field showing how field monitoring and trace investigations support a range of upstream efforts to address the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

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Lutter contre la prolifération illicite et le détournement de produits utilisés dans la fabrication d’engins explosifs improvisés (EEI).

مكافحة تحويل استخدام والانتشار غير المشروع للمواد المستخدمة في تصنيع العبوات الناسفة المرتجلة

Night vision equipment includes a range of imaging systems enabling humans to see at night, including thermal imaging devices. The Taliban's ability to access and deploy night vision equipment was a significant factor in the years before the group's takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021.

This Frontline Perspective, the third in a series from CAR's field operations in Afghanistan between 2019 and 2021, reports on two commercial supply lines through which the Taliban sought to procure thermal imaging weapon sights. These sights, manufactured in the past five years, were commercially available in the United States and United Arab Emirates.

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بين أيلول 2021 وحزيران 2022، وثّق المحققون الميدانيون لمركز أبحاث التسليح أثناء الصراعات بقايا قطع صواريخ من 17 هجوم بصواريخ جو-أرض بالتعاون مع قوات الأمن المحلية. هذه أنظمة صواريخ تم تصنيعها في تركيا ومن المحتمل أنها أطلقت من الطائرات بدون طيار (انظر قسم “توثيق الضربات الصاروخية في سوريا”) وأظهرت تحقيقات مركز أبحاث التسليح أثناء الصراعات أن بعض مكونات الصواريخ تم تصنيعها في الخارج واستيرادها للاستخدام في صناعات الدفاع التركية وتشمل هذه مكونات مهمة متاحة تجارياً والتي لا يبدو أنها مشمولة بضوابط التصدير الحالية.

An analysis of how using customs and shipping records can inform investigations into the diversion of precursor materials used in improvised explosive devices.

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A guide to identifying weapons and ammunition produced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) using examples of materiel documented by CAR in the field. This field guide provides diagrams showing distinguishing features of AK-pattern small arms, small-calibre ammunition (7.62 mm to 14.5 mm), and medium to large calibre ammunition (40 mm rockets and 130 mm artillery ammunition). Diagrams also show distinguishing features of packaging, including false descriptions of package contents.

This guide was updated in 2023 to include newly-observed rifle models as well as a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.

Between September 2021 and June 2022, CAR investigations have documented the physical remnants of 17 air-to-surface missile attacks in north-east Syria. The missile systems were manufactured in Türkiye and likely fired from uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). This Frontline Perspective provides a technical overview of the missiles themselves, including CAR’s identification process and the internal components identified within the system. It then focuses on how electromagnetic brakes, which are used in accurate steering in missile technology, were manufactured by a company based in the European Union (EU) and were subsequently diverted from their stated end use in medical vehicles.

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In 2019 CAR investigators travelled to the Diffa region of south-eastern Niger to document weapons and ammunition seized from terrorist groups operating in the areas around Lake Chad. In this Dispatch from the Field, CAR provides a first systematic assessment of the origins and supply sources of some of the illicit weaponry deployed by militants affiliated with Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (the Sunni Muslim Group for Preaching and Jihad, or JAS)—more commonly referred to as Boko Haram—and the emergent Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

En 2019 les chercheurs de CAR se sont rendus dans la région de Diffa dans le sud-est du Niger pour documenter des armes et des munitions saises à des des groupes djihadistes œuvrant dans les régions autour du lac Tchad. La présente dépêche fournit la première étude systématique sur les origines de certaines des armes illicites déployées par les militants affiliés au Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) – plus couramment connu sous le nom de Boko Haram – et l’État Islamique en Afrique de l’Ouest (EIAO).

С 2018 года следственные CAR проводят в полях экспертизу военной техники, изъятую у вооруженных образований самопровозглашенных Донецкой и Луганской “Народных Республик” (ДНР и ЛНР) на востоке Украины.

Этот отчет является результатом трехлетнего исследования источников поставок оружия, боеприпасов, транспортных средств, бронетехники и артиллерии, использующихся в ходе конфликта. Изучите динамические тематические исследования и ознакомьтесь с данными расследования в CAR Ukraine iTrace Resource Centre.

З 2018 року слідчі CAR проводять у полях експертизу військової техніки, вилучену у збройних утворень самопроголошених Донецької та Луганської “Народних Республік” (ДНР та ЛНР) на сході України.

Цей звіт є результатом трирічного дослідження джерел постачання зброї, боєприпасів, транспортних засобів, бронетехніки та артилерії, що використовуються під час конфлікту.Вивчіть динамічні тематичні дослідження та ознайомтесь з даними розслідування в CAR Ukraine iTrace Resource Centre.

Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in mid-August 2021, concerns have grown over the changing terrorist landscape in the country and the threat posed by groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). This second Frontline Perspective focuses on weapons used in two high-profile attacks in Kabul: the May 2019 Taliban-claimed attack on Counterpart International, and the November 2020 ISKP-claimed attack on Kabul University. It helps shine a spotlight on tactics and weapon selection for such high-profile attacks, and highlights important similarities between the weapons used.

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Since 2018, CAR field investigation teams have carried out forensic documentation of the military equipment that has been recovered from armed formations of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk 'People's Republics' (DPR and LPR) in eastern Ukraine.

This report is the result of a three-year study into the supply sources of weapons, ammunition, vehicles, armour, and artillery used in the conflict.

Explore dynamic case studies and interact with the data from these investigations in CAR's Ukraine iTrace Resource Centre

Recent Taliban seizures of equipment previously provided to Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) by the United States and NATO probably constitutes one of the most significant large-scale diversion of military equipment in recent history. This Frontline Perspective, the first in a series from CAR's investigations in Afghanistan, explores the long-standing capacity of the Taliban and other armed actors in Afghanistan to access weapons that had been issued to ANDSF, and considers the systemic challenges that have enabled weapon diversion from national custody.

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For this Technical Report, a CAR field investigation team disassembled a recovered AM-50 anti-materiel rifle and comprehensively documented its component parts. This report provides a technical analysis of each of these components, highlighting key identifying features and yielding new insight into Iran’s weapon manufacturing practices.

As part of the European Union-funded ‘Field Forensic Firearms Exploitation’ (F3E) project, CAR and implementing partner TTE-Europe GmbH are developing innovative solutions to enhance the capability of states to manage and trace SALW, using radio frequency identification (RFID) transponders. This report discusses the research and development activities conducted during 2020.

The findings of an 18-month investigation mapping the human and financial networks behind the global procurement of goods and technologies for Islamic State weapons production. Shows how Islamic State procurers concealed their efforts behind front companies, pseudonymous communications and proxy purchasers.

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نتائج تحقيق استمر 18 شهراً يحدد الشبكات البشرية والمالية وراء الشراء العالمي للسلع والتقنيات المستخدمة في إنتاج أسلحة تنظيم داعش. يُظهر هذا التحقيق كيف أخفى سماسرة التنظيم جهودهم وراء الشركات الوهمية والأسماء المستعارة والوكلاء لإتمام عمليات الشراء.

Bu rapor, IŞİD’in silah üretimi için kullandığı küresel mal ve teknoloji tedarik zincirlerinin ardında yatan insan şebekeleri ve finansal ağların haritalanması için 18 ay süren bir araştırmanın bulgularını içerir ve IŞİD tedarikçilerinin çalışmalarını nasıl paravan şirketler, sahte iletişimler ve vekil alıcılar kullanarak sakladığını gösterir.

An analysis of: Conflict Armament Research’s trace response archive; the processes that underpin tracing; and tracing as a tool to combat diversion.

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This dispatch tracks the evolution of Houthi unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which have become increasingly lethal and powerful. CAR finds that the Yemeni group is able to domestically manufacture some components while procuring more sophisticated electronic items from foreign supply networks.

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تتبع هذه البرقية تطور الطائرات بدون طيار للحوثيين والذي أصبح يزداد في الضراوة والقوة. تجد منظمة بحوث التسلح أثناء الصراعات بأن هذه المجموعة اليمنية قادرة على صناعة بعض المكونات محليا فيما تقوم بالحصول على المكونات الإلكترونية الأكثر تطورا من شبكات الموردين الخارجية.

This dispatch presents the first field-based study of small arms and ammunition used by armed groups and communities in northern Nigeria’s herder-farmer conflicts. It identifies weapons diverted from state stockpiles across the Sahel and trafficked into Nigeria through long-range organised criminal networks.

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This report shows that external supply chains have provided components for the construction of IEDS to Bahraini militants. This materiel is identical to materiel captured from Houthi forces in Yemen and demonstrates Bahraini militants’ capability to manufacture explosives and IEDs domestically.

This second edition of CAR’s Diversion Digest analyses a sample of end-user documents in CAR’s archive that relate to actual deliveries of conventional weapons and ammunition. The analysis finds increased risk of illicit arms transfers due to “deeply inconsistent” export certification practices.

Based on three years of fieldwork, this report shows how military equipment has reached all sides of South Sudan’s civil war: through the intermediation of neighbouring states, through networks of brokers and intermediaries, and via air and land logistics.

يقدم هذا التقرير نظرة موسعة حول الألغام والعبوات الناسفة المرتجلة التي تستخدمها قوات الحوثيين في الساحل الغربي لليمن. وقد كشفت تحقيقات مؤسسة “أبحاث التسليح أثناء الصراعات” (CAR) أن جزءاً هاماً من هذه الألغام عبارة عن ألغام مرتجلة مُصنَّعة محلياً من طرف قوات الحوثيين.

This technical report addresses the need for a supply chain security approach to detect and react to cases of diversion of conventional ammunition. Based on CAR’s field data, this report profiles how ammunition is commonly diverted, outlines the limitations in how international arms control instruments address this issue, and details the mutually reinforcing control measures that make up ‘ammunition supply chain security.’ 

The report provides an extensive overview of landmines and IEDs being employed by Houthi forces on the west coast of Yemen. CAR’s investigations reveal that a significant portion of landmines are improvised and produced, domestically, by Houthi forces.

This first edition of CAR’s Diversion Digest presents a statistical analysis of how weapons diversion occurs. It looks at more than a thousand cases where weapons and ammunition have been captured, lost, stolen or otherwise diverted to illicit actors, and considers how the international Arms Trade Treaty might address these main causes of diversion.

In 2017, Islamic State forces deployed four different models of improvised recoilless launcher well suited for urban warfare. This report studies the features and components of these sophisticated inventions.

CAR presents comparative findings on explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), camouflaged to resemble natural rocks, documented in Yemen and similar devices documented by field investigation teams elsewhere in the Middle East.

“تعرض مؤسسة ’أبحاث التسليح أثناء الصراعات‘ (CAR) في هذا التقرير نتائج مقارَنة بين المقذوفات المُكوَّنة انفجارياً (EFPs)– المُموَّهة لتشابه الصخور الطبيعية – التي تم توثيقها في اليمن، وبين أجهزة مشابهة موثقة في مناطق أخرى في الشرق الأوسط من قبل فرق تحقيقات ميدانية”.

“إن هذا التقرير ثمرة لما يزيد عن ثلاث سنوات من التحقيقات الميدانية في قنوات الإمداد والتوريد التي يتزود منها تنظيم “داعش”. فهذا التقرير يشمل تحليلاً لأكثر من 40 ألف قطعة تم انتشالها من التنظيم بين 2014 و2017، وتشمل هذه القطع أسلحة وذخائر ومكونات يمكن تعقُّبها وسلائف كيميائية سبق أن استخدمهما التنظيم في تصنيع العبوات الناسفة.”

This report is the result of more than three years of field investigation into Islamic State supply chains. It presents an analysis of more than 40,000 items recovered from the group between 2014 and 2017. These items encompass weapons, ammunition, and the traceable components and chemical precursors used by the group to manufacture improvised explosive devices.

CAR analysis of a water-borne improvised explosive device (WBIED) deployed by Houthi forces in Yemen.

An analysis of captured equipment in the possession of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North in the Nuba Mountains.

فيمعركةالموصل،استخدمتقواتتنظيم “داعش” طائراتتجاريةبدونطيار(درونات) مزودةبعبوات ناسفة مصمَّمةخصيصاًلهذاالغرض. يُذكر أنالتفاوتاتالتقنيةالملاحظةأثناء معاينةالأجهزةالمنتشَلةتؤكدمنجديدنزوعالتنظيمإلىإجراء اختباراتميدانيةتساعده على تجويد نظمالأسلحة المتوفرة لديه بشكل سريع،بمايشمل ذلك استغلالالتكنولوجياتالناشئةمثلالدرونات.

In the battle of Mosul, Islamic State forces have used commercial drones fitted with specially designed improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Technical variations observed on the devices recovered reconfirm the group’s propensity to field-test and rapidly refine its weapon systems—including exploiting emerging technologies, such as drones.

This Dispatch provides evidence of ongoing efforts by the Sudanese government to obscure the origin of weapons and ammunition it supplies to its forces and proxy armed groups. It also reveals Sudan’s access to military and commercial supply lines from Iran and European States.

CAR investigators uncovered ongoing Iranian technology transfers to Houthi rebels. This Perspective documents the use of UAVs to disable Saudi-led Coalition Patriot missile-defence systems in Yemen, indicating an evolution in advanced asymmetric tactics.

“كشف محققومؤسسة’أبحاث التسليح أثناء الصراعات‘ عن عملياتجاريةلنقل تكنولوجيات إيرانية إلى المتمردين الحوثيين. وهذه الورقةتوثق حالات استخدام طائرات بدون طيار لتعطيل منظومات الدفاع الصاروخي من طراز “باتريوت”التابعة لقوات التحالف بقيادةالسعودية في اليمن، مما يشير إلى تطور في التكتيكاتالحربية غير المتماثلة”.

This Dispatch is the result of field investigations during the initial phases of the assault on IS forces in eastern Mosul. It provides clear evidence of IS ability to manufacture weapons on an industrial scale, with output running into the tens of thousands.

This Dispatch examines weapons seized from illegal dhow shipments destined for Somalia and Yemen, in February and March 2016.

This report is the product of field investigations conducted over ten months, in eight countries, to reveal sources of weapons for armed groups and Islamist fighters across North and West Africa. It identifies a network of Sahelian trafficking routes stretching as far afield as Syria, Mali and Cote d’Ivoire.

«Ce rapport est le fruit d’enquêtes de terrain menées pendant plus de dix mois, dans huit pays, afin de révéler les sources d’armement des groupes armés et des combattants islamistes en Afrique du Nord et de l’Ouest. Le rapport identifie un réseau de routes de trafic sahélienqui s’étend jusqu’en Syrie, le Mali et la Côte d’Ivoire».

CAR field investigation teams have documented the content of a drone workshop in Ramadi two weeks after the city was liberated from IS control. Photographic evidence shows the group has been experimenting with armed drones since as early as February 2016.

CAR field teams entered Fallujah three days after the Iraqi city was liberated from IS control, to discover an IED factory with evidence of industrialised production and bureaucratic organisation of improvised weapons.

An update on CAR’s continued investigation into IS acquisition of nitrate-based fertiliser for the construction of IEDs. In June 2016, in the wake of two car bombings and a CAR report into chemical component provision, Turkey’s Ministry of Agriculture suspended all national sales of the product.

“يستعرض هذا التقرير دراسة فاحصة لما يزيد عن 700 عنصر (قطع ومكونات ومواد) استخدمتها قوات “داعش” في تصنيع العبوات الناسفة،مع تحديد مصادرها واقتفاء سلاسل حيازتها، كما يعرض نتائج التحقيقات الميدانية التي أجريت في العراق وسوريا على مدى 20 شهراً انطلاقاً من يوليو 2014″.

This report examines more than 700 components used by IS forces to manufacture IEDs, identifies their provenance, and traces their chains of custody. The report presents findings from field investigations in Iraq and Syria conducted over a period of 20 months from July 2014.

This Dispatch documents weapons and ammunition supplied by Khartoum and airdropped to SPLA-iO rebel forces in South Sudan in November 2014.

This Dispatch outlines weapons and ammunition that Kurdish YPG forces captured from Islamic State forces during the siege of Kobane, Syria, September 2014-January 2015.

This report presents preliminary findings from a six-month field investigation from April to September 2014 into weapons used by non-state armed groups in the Central African Republic. It finds military vehicles and ammunition newly-supplied to Séléka rebel forces from Sudan during 2013, and military material from European suppliers originally supplied to Bozizé-era government forces and to other countries.

This Dispatch from the Field‘s findings derive from a series of Conflict Armament Research (CAR) field investigations conducted in the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq and northern Syria 22 July–15 August 2014.

This dispatch outlines preliminary findings from an examination of weapons and ammunition captured from Islamic State (IS) forces in Iraq and Syria between mid-June 2014 and early August 2014.

This report documents six years of collaborative investigations into the distribution of Iranian ammunition in Africa. It is the first comprehensive study of Iran’s weapon ‘footprint’ on the continent.

Focusing on nine African states, it identifies Iranian-manufactured ammunition in service with government forces and a variety of non-state entities, including foreign-backed insurgents, rebel forces, Islamist-oriented armed groups, and warring civilian communities.

A guide to identifying marks on Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles. This field guide provides comprehensive information on the design and positioning of marks applied to more than 30 models of Kalashnikov-pattern weapons from around the world.

A comprehensive guide to understanding the meaning of marks applied to small-calibre ammunition packaging of Russian, former Soviet and Chinese origins. This field guide also provides information on cartridge headstamping and how it relates to marks applied to packaging (such as factory and year codes).

An extensive list of man-portable air defence system (MANPADS) component parts and their designations (from SA-7 to SA-24 systems). This field guide provides a succinct, but effective, way to identify system components from their markings and marks applied to packaging. Includes cyrillic designations.

Tables providing packing weights and quantities of Warsaw Pact-calibre ammunition (from 5.45 mm to 14.5 mm). This field guide facilitates the rapid estimation of illicit ammunition transfer volumes. The tables feature all-up weight (AUW) data and calculations for a variety of modes of transfer, including ISO containers and various aircraft with a history of use in illicit arms transfers.

A co-publication with the Small Arms Survey, Geneva, the report documents weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in service with rebel forces in Mali during the 2012–13 conflict.

The report identifies 41 weapon and ammunition types, ranging from small-calibre ammunition to major conventional armaments and military vehicles.